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Quaoser 5 
Introduction 
From the Joker to Norman Bates, vicious characters of the irrational kind seem to 
scare us the most - and for good reason. Lack of empathy, sheer hatred, or skewed 
worldviews reveal an apathy to the traditional reasons we value life, justice, and fairness. 
These characters exacerbate our moral sensibilities by undermining moral rules that we 
think are often universal, and when presented with reasons for acting differently they 
consistently deny and ignore their force. A crude response to this problem would assert 
that these individuals are simply beyond the reach of philosophy - that philosophy and its 
emphasis on reasons can only be for individuals with the appropriate starting character or 
for those who are ‘rational’ to begin with. This posits that philosophy’s shortcomings 
reside in the accessibility of the form rather than its methodology and emphasis on 
deliberation.  
Most would agree, however, that it’s not only these vicious, irrational characters 
of bad moral dispositions that often fail to deliberate correctly. All of us have moral 
shortcomings of one or another that follow a similarly ‘vicious’ behavior of resistance to 
deliberation in even the most minute aspect of our lives. This asks if philosophy can only 
help with the parts of one’s moral behavior subject to controlled thinking and 
deliberation. That is, the study of reasons in the philosophical methodology may only 
benefit those who have already begun deliberating reasonably at least in some parts of 
their moral conceptions.  
 In this paper I explore the philosophical implications of decision theory and 
deliberation on ethics, paying special attention to how vicious individuals yearn for a 
separate philosophical account.  Drawing largely on Fricker, McDowell, Paul, and 
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Nussbaum I discuss how transformative experiences open a window for understanding 
moral development in terms of habituation in the Aristotelian sense, and further how the 
vicious individual’s failure to deliberate may be remedied via a transformation through 
art.  
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Deliberation 
Read almost any standard philosopher and the pathway to understanding their 
argument lies in their reasons. Reasons for caring about the poorest in our society or the 
importance of honesty seem to find force because they provide a framework for 
understanding why we should act in some way by virtue of agreed-upon principles, or – 
in the case of especially good philosophy – clever premises that fold into irrefutable 
conclusions. The philosophical canon relies on an understanding of ethics that follows a 
methodology that reasons via evidence and logic – an empirical view of ethics. The 
movement from a prior belief to the philosopher’s argued belief concerns itself with only 
one particular route, a route steeped in deliberation or controlled thinking. In the case of 
‘vicious characters’ or individuals who do not find reason statements motivating, we can 
take several interpretations of different frameworks for understanding why.  
 First, philosophy may be compelling on an internalist account. As outlined in 
Bernard Williams Internal and External Reasons paper, an internalist conception of 
motivating statements requires that any reason must be compelling for someone if the 
reason furthers a prior-existing motivation in their “subjective motivational set” 
(McConnell 95).  The elements in such a set may be formally recognized as ‘desires’ but 
more elaborately understood as “dispositions of evaluation, patterns of emotional 
reaction, personal loyalties, and various projects...embodying the commitments of the 
agent” (McConnell 96). For example, Paul has reason to give this student an A on his 
thesis because he believes it aligns with his motivation or his desire to reward good work. 
The process by which he begins to believe that a reason may be compelling is a 
deliberative one.  
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The crude view of the internalist account requires deliberation from these existing 
motivations. There can be a reason that indicates an agent should take action X but the 
agent may not realize that action X furthers a satisfaction or desire of some elements in 
their motivational set. Thus, the deliberative process of believing a reason is motivating 
relies on an unrestrictive sense of practical reasoning, that is involving a heuristic and 
imaginative reflection. Simply put, the process of forming beliefs crudely involves 
personal experiences, knowledge, and imagination. For example, one might come to 
understand roughly what heartbreak is like via having experienced heartbreak 
themselves, having seen the reactions elicited by those in heartbreak, or by imagining 
themselves in a situation of heartbreak. This isn’t to say that the heuristic and imaginative 
aspects of deliberation are separate or defined as any more important than each other; 
rather, it’s merely to characterize the deliberative process as involving both knowledge 
and imagination. 
We might consider this deliberation to be quite complex from a psychological 
standpoint. The time-ordering of pre-existing motivations, the combination of them, or 
the individual weight of each motivation suggests that deliberation may quickly get 
messy from a psychoanalytic view. The imaginative aspects of deliberation also point to a 
view of practical reasoning that involves unconscious and intertwined socialized and 
biased processes - a result of being habituated in certain norms since birth - what Fricker 
calls “moral luck” (Fricker 33). This process of imagining an action, its outcome, and 
how it may act towards satisfying prior-existing motivations only serves to augment the 
deliberative route, not carve out new ones. While the internalist is quick to admit that 
deliberation quickly becomes entangled and unclear even for the individual parsing their 
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own motivations, the internalist account of deliberation requires that the individual 
“control” the “thinking by which one determines what one has reason to do” because this 
is preferable to a non-cognitive understanding of ethical deliberation (McConnell 97). 
Thus, when this deliberation leads astray it is because of a lack of reasons or a belief in 
particular reasons on the part of the agent.  A methodology that emphasizes reasons in the 
internalist conception, however, still views their force as coming out of a controlled route 
of thinking or deliberative process no matter how complex.  
 
The crude view of the internalist: 
 
                  
 
On this conception of belief formation, then, ideas and reasons are motivating 
only via deliberation, but this posits an unsatisfactory framework for understanding when 
deliberation fails for individuals. Imagine a character, of the Aristotelian variety, who 
maintains a vicious disposition by virtue of the fact that they deliberate without practical 
reasoning or the evidence-based explanations philosophy engages with. I use the term 
‘vicious’ to denote a demeanor that does not epistemically value reasons and therefore 
fails to deliberate correctly. To be clear, viciousness, while normally having a negative 
normative connotation, purely indicates an inability to deliberate correctly, often for 
morally or epistemically inculpable reasons. That is, reasons have no motivating force 
towards their action precisely because their prior existing motivations don’t value any 
force these reasons might have. As Fricker elaborates, there are often circumstances 
where a “subject’s patterns of judgement are influenced by the prejudices of his day in a 
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context where it would take a very exceptional epistemic character to overcome those 
prejudices” (Fricker 33). In such a situation, it may be “simply too much to expect the 
subject to achieve awareness that a certain prejudice is structuring his social 
consciousness, let alone to realign his habits...accordingly” (Fricker 33). Fricker labels 
such an individual as having circumstantial epistemic ‘bad luck’ (Fricker 33). 
If we take the internalist’s emphasis on deliberation, then, this viciousness in the 
epistemic sense will also often take on a moral feature. Vicious characters of the 
epistemic variety will also have a viciousness of the moral variety if we believe that 
moral conclusions are the subject of deliberation on the part of these individuals. In this 
way, we can understand this vicious character as having both ‘circumstantial’ epistemic 
bad luck and also what Nagel calls circumstantial moral bad luck (Fricker 33). To bring it 
home, this means that quite often there are ethical considerations that are reasons only for 
individuals whose internal reasons are suitably related to ethics - the idea being that an 
individual could be left cold by all of the reasons in the entire body of ethics if they are of 
a vicious character to begin with. The internalist response to this type of individual from 
a philosophical view suggests that, if only the individual had more reasons, believed the 
right reasons, or more generally began deliberating correctly, ethics - or any set of 
reasons previously uncompelling - would become motivating and result in proper action.  
To make clear why this response is unsatisfactory, we can consider two types of 
vicious characters that pose a problem for deliberation. First, in a Fricker-style, we can 
imagine that an individual has the epistemic bad luck of being raised in a racist household 
or community. The habits and social norms of their upbringing limit their exposure to 
different conceptions of other racial groups, and as such this individual - let’s call them 
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Rory - remains staunchly racist for their whole life, ignoring factual and experiential 
evidence that contradicts their racist beliefs. As such, Rory has a viciousness of the first 
form - an incapacity to deliberate properly. Their incapacity can be the result of various 
factors such as identity, sentimental attachment, habituation, or simply apathy. I use the 
term ‘incapacity’ to indicate that Rory does not view what we might understand as 
‘evidence’ as compelling. In the moral sense, then, as we might discuss about an 
individual with epistemic and moral bad luck, Rory cannot deliberate properly largely for 
reasons external to the deliberative process itself, which will become evident later. 
A vicious character of the second form describes an individual with the inability 
to translate this deliberation properly or the inability to have deliberation, even if rational, 
help in forming a decision on the proper action. Individuals who accept that racism is 
wrong and attempt to reduce the effects of discrimination may still be prejudiced despite 
their beliefs and deliberation. That is, unlike Rory, an individual - let’s call them Aubrey 
- could be deliberating rationally and seeing reasons as compelling but their deliberation 
remains skewed in ways that are non-deliberative. To be clearer, an individual with 
implicit biases may still see reasons as compelling but not as compelling or in the right 
framing that they should. While this is a deliberative issue, it cannot be solved via more 
deliberation - as I will show later. Furthermore, even if one does rationally deliberate, 
these biases may also undermine the link between deliberation and proper action in that 
it’s not clear, even from deliberating properly, how to change the way this individual 
perceives via deliberation. Thus, the internalist has no response for how such an instance 
of more deliberation may help in any respect. I use the term ‘inability’ to indicate the 
problem viciousness poses for the link between deliberation and proper action given 
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someone’s deliberation is sufficiently rational to begin with. Thus, the difference between 
the ‘incapacity’ to deliberate and the ‘inability’ to do so describes the difference between 
an irrational deliberator (incapacity) and a rational deliberator (inability). My 
dichotomizing of the rational and irrational deliberator along these lines isn’t to posit this 
framework as correct but merely as an instrumental way to show later why the internalist 
and empiricist’s view of morals and ethical deliberation fails. 
I should also note that there are two distinct types of individuals with the inability 
to deliberate properly. The first, as has already been introduced, involves those with 
implicit biases against different groups who may not be able to effectively recognize the 
exercise of these biases. Even if recognition occurs, it’s not clear that an individual can 
deliberate away these subconscious and imaginative processes via more reasons or the 
right reasons (which will become clear later).  We could also consider another example 
of the inability to deliberate as not an issue with translating certain reasons properly but 
rather a limitation in experience. An individual who has never experienced love for 
example and firmly believes that love merely indicates a strong passion between two 
sexually compatible partners may never consider the type of reasons or experiences of 
love one may give as compelling for their deliberation on the issue. As is the case with 
childbirth, love, or Nagel’s example of the bat, there are certain experiences that 
transcend both imagination and reasonable description, thereby being inaccessible to the 
faculties of deliberation no matter how rational.  
The vicious character underscores how a transition from viciousness to 
considering the situation aright often cannot occur with just deliberation. The internalist 
conceives of deliberation as a function or algorithm by which an individual inputs various 
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reasons and experiences on a deliberative route and its output describes an action or 
conclusion that aligns with pre-existing motivations. This then leads to proper action and 
proper perceptions of situations. However, even if we believe the deliberative route of the 
internalist, the ‘function’ of deliberation for the vicious character does not value reasons 
or experiences as they stand purely because their ‘function’ is incapable or unable of 
deliberating correctly, for the circumstances listed above. As such, the transition from 
viciousness to proper deliberation often cannot be just the product of deliberation. Put 
simply, one cannot begin deliberating rationally or correctly by way of more rationale or 
reasons. Deliberation itself may not be sufficient and thus the internalist’s response that a 
vicious character requires better deliberation or better/right reasons cannot be the case if 
deliberation in the most proper conception is itself impossible for the individual.  
Our threshold for viciousness need not be so strict to still pose its issue for the 
internalist account. We could easily imagine a character who is only vicious in certain 
aspects of their deliberation or for specific topics. L.A. Paul’s account of experience 
denotes how humans “vary so much and so deeply that even small differences 
(contextually speaking) in experiences between people can prevent [one] from knowing 
what it is like to be a different type of person” (Paul 7). For example, dichotomies in 
developed versus developing societies, different stratifications of wealth, gender, race, 
and personal histories structure barriers to fully realizing what it may be like to be 
another person. As such, when it comes to reaching moral or epistemic conclusions, there 
may be a “deep and familiar fact that different subjective points of view, as different 
conscious perspectives, can be fundamentally inaccessible to each other” (Paul 8). Much 
like a vicious person cannot understand the deliberation of the ‘rational’ individual, the 
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reverse is also true.  Where one may have prejudices and biases that can be deliberated 
upon in one sphere, an individual may also be likely to not deliberate properly in certain 
spheres for all the circumstantial reasons listed above. It’s not just that practical reasoning 
can’t bridge gaps of difference in experience; rather, it’s more that this type of 
deliberation is not sufficient enough to “know what it is really like to be an octopus, or to 
be a slave, or to be blind” (Paul 8).  
This means that most if not all individuals are vicious in some sense by virtue of 
the fact that they cannot deliberate to reach a place of full understanding of certain 
experiences and thus are not able to conclude properly on them. Again, I return to the 
previous example of the individual who has implicit biases, Aubrey. Such biases cannot 
be deliberated upon and any individual socialized or habituated in our current norms will 
have some biases, towards truth and particular interpretations of features of a situation. 
This isn’t to say all biases are bad but that all individuals have them specific to their own 
experiences, for better or for worse. As a result, viciousness or a failure to deliberate 
remains present in all individuals if we acknowledge differences in experiences between 
humans, at some point and in some arena of thought. If any part of an individual’s 
deliberation is vicious, the internalist account views this purely as irrational and unable to 
be affected by the type of reasons given in philosophy. Thus, the internalist account must 
grapple with not just individuals who are vicious in the holistic sense but also individuals 
who are vicious in any sense.  
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The internalist view with vicious persons: 
                   
Simply put, an individual who doesn’t deliberate rationally cannot be swayed 
purely via reason to begin deliberating correctly, and, as I’ve shown, almost all 
individuals do deliberate viciously in some respect. This seems to suggest that under the 
internalist account philosophy is only accessible or effective for certain topics, the ones 
by which an individual deliberates properly upon (if one can even know that). The idea 
that philosophy can only help once we begin deliberating correctly seems to beg the 
question of how we may begin deliberating correctly at all if we are vicious in some 
respect to begin with. This transition from viciousness to virtuousness does happen; we 
see this change in ourselves and those around us all the time, so explaining such a drastic 
change, if it comes not from deliberation, must involve a separate process. 
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Transformative Experiences 
 Transitioning from viciousness to virtuousness seems to often involve what can 
only be understood as a transformation. This kind of transformation can either set you on 
track to have the ability to deliberate or to transform your actual motivations held or both. 
In the first case, this transformation can so fundamentally alter preferences and the 
reasons valued that one does begin to acknowledge reasons that were previously 
uncompelling, that is they begin to deliberate correctly. More interestingly, however, the 
second case transformation can shape an entirely new non-deliberative route to a moral 
conclusion. The change from deliberating incorrectly to seeing a situation aright can 
often be understood as a dramatic change in personal preferences, perception of the 
world, a fundamental shift in identity, a profound new way of imagining, or a new set of 
beliefs and motivations. So, for example, we could take the racist individual  - Rory - 
from above and suppose they have never had an experience with an individual of another 
racial group. We could consider their deliberation transformed via multiple experiences 
with persons of other racial groups that fundamentally change their preferences. The 
individual suddenly begins to deliberate correctly and reasons that were previously 
uncompelling now become motivating because of the introduction of new information 
and a new ability to imagine. This type of transformation enables the individual to go 
from a state of viciousness to ‘rationality’ and thus come to the ‘right’ conclusion via 
deliberation. This type of transformative experience seems largely compatible with a 
tweaked internalist account that integrates the vicious individual.  
However, as I plan to show, the racist individual may also have a transformative 
experience where his perceptions and his beliefs on the matter shift, not necessarily 
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because of an augmentation in a deliberative process but rather an augmentation of a non-
deliberative process. Thus, where one transformative experience directly affects 
epistemic viciousness the other fundamentally reconstructs perceptions and the 
motivations they may elicit without deliberation.  
 Given this first and second case, we can draw upon L.A. Paul’s distinction that 
transformative experiences are of two types: ‘epistemically transformative’ or ‘personally 
transformative’. Her account posits that experiences teach us about the world and further 
give us knowledge that can only be gained via the experience itself. Despite her emphasis 
on decision theory and deliberation, I draw largely from her framework because it will 
usefully illustrate the power of transformation.  
 
Epistemic Transformations 
Frank Jackson’s example of Mary, a woman who since birth has been living in a 
black-and-white room, poses an interesting thought experiment about an epistemically 
transformative experience. The example posits that even if Mary could, through the most 
advanced scientific methods today, understand the wavelength of the color red, its 
specific frequency, its interaction with other particles, its psychological effect on her, and 
even the way her irises might change in response to the color at the neurological level she 
would not understand what it would be like to see the color red. She could read all the 
textbooks on seeing red, consult all her color-world friends about what it might be like, 
and even watch her friends’ reactions to the color red and yet she would still be in what 
Paul coins a “special kind of epistemic poverty” (Paul 10). That is, Mary, despite all these 
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crude approximations for the experience, would still not fully understand what it is like to 
see the color red without actually having the experience itself. 
Mary’s epistemic poverty describes her inability to have the knowledge or the 
imaginative pieces to deliberate properly. In this case, Mary cannot accurately speak to 
how the experience of seeing color may affect her specifically and subjectively. In the 
realm of deliberation, Mary remains impoverished before leaving the room in the sense 
that she cannot gain the knowledge or reasons by which she can judge the experience of 
seeing red; she can only gain this knowledge through the experience itself. Upon leaving 
the room, Mary “transforms her epistemic perspective, and by doing so,...transforms her 
point of view” (Paul 10). She gains the knowledge of what it’s like to see color, the 
ability to imagine similar experiences of seeing colors, the ability to construct a future 
conception of seeing colors, and an ability to discern her preferences from her past 
memory of the experience. In this transformation, Mary has then gained the ability to 
suddenly “entertain certain contents”, “understand things in a new way”, and may even 
“gain new information” (Paul 11).  
Mary undergoes an epistemic transformation by leaving the black-and-white 
room. Such an experience enables her to consider reasons that were previously 
inaccessible to her. Old reasons that were no longer compelling – imagine explaining the 
concept of a Rubik’s cube to Mary before she leaves the room – now suddenly may 
become compelling. Not only has she gained new information, Mary can now fully 
comprehend, feel, and understand reasons that could have been only understood in the 
context of having the experience of leaving the room and seeing color. It’s not that Mary 
was deliberating irrationally - we might say so from a perspective of having seen color - 
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but rather that she was acting viciously in the sense that she was unable to properly 
deliberate on the concept of color before her transformative experience, largely because 
she was in epistemic impoverishment; she had no relevant understanding of color. I use 
the term ‘relevant’ here to bring attention to the fact that Mary can know what color is 
and how it operates in various senses (scientific, emotional, etc.) without truly 
understanding its subjective or personal effect on her. Mary’s conception of color 
drastically takes on a new form she could not have predicted before the 
experience. Mary’s deliberative route becomes fundamentally changed by giving her new 
information and new abilities to augment her deliberation, making old reasons more 
compelling perhaps and helping her reach ‘better’ conclusions. 
The epistemic transformation can fall in line with much of a tweaked internalist’s 
thinking. Mary’s experience transforms her perspective so as to enable her to begin 
deliberating correctly with respect to, say, completing the Rubik’s Cube. More clearly, if 
we remember the original internalist framework, Mary begins as a vicious person who 
becomes transformed into a ‘rational’ person on the topic of color by way of this 
epistemically transformative experience. As a ‘rational’ person, she then deliberates and 
comes to her conclusion via her reasons, preferences, and pre-existing motivations in 
what we might describe as a ‘correct’ way. This seems to be the natural internalist 
response that was mentioned earlier in this paper. New reasons and new information and 
new abilities of imagination augment a previously incorrect deliberation to allow the 
person to see the situation aright. Most straightforwardly, it seems clear that this is only 
one possible way of transforming a vicious person to a rational person, and at the very 
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least the less interesting proposition for understanding the problem viciousness poses for 
deliberation. 
 
A tweaked internalist conception: 
 
 
The epistemically transformative experience seems to raise more questions for the 
internalist account than it answers. At first, it seems that the examples of epistemic 
transformation do what the internalist needs: provides a fundamental piece of 
information, knowledge, or altering to imagination that enable the individual to begin 
deliberating properly. The nature of these types of epistemically transformative 
experiences, however, is that they cannot come about via philosophical reasons or 
explanation. They must be experienced firsthand or at the very least must have some 
subjective experiential component that cannot be transferred via the traditional 
philosophical reasons and arguments. The whole point of Mary leaving the room is that 
this type of experience is so subjective and experiential in nature that no inferential 
deliberation could supplement Mary’s inexperience. She had to have that experience to 
deliberate accurately.  
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This raises two issues for a deliberative and empirical account of ethics. First, and 
more abstractly, what kind of answer does internalist philosophy give for supplementing 
an individual who lacks in certain basic and/or epistemically rich experiences? As it 
stands, the internalist must admit that the only way for this type of vicious person to 
begin deliberation correctly involves a fundamentally non-inferential and therefore non-
philosophical process. Whether internalists choose to define this process generally as a 
reason or an expansion of deliberative ability, there is still a concern with how 
philosophy can do something so experiential for an individual if we view deliberation via 
reasons as the only way to understand motivated action. Secondly, and more 
immediately, does epistemic transformation solve all the issues associated with the 
failures of deliberation discussed earlier? As I will show with personally transformative 
experiences, there are still barriers to deliberation that are not addressed by purely 
epistemic transformations and the more interesting cases of transformation cannot be 
solved by deliberation. 
Recall the earlier examples of viciousness where individuals are incapable of 
deliberation. In one example, the individual - let’s call them Aubrey - recognizes the 
immorality of racism but still cannot realize their implicit bias or eliminate such 
unconscious processes by way of deliberation. In the other example, an individual - 
named Joey - believes in a particularly specific conception of love whereby their personal 
experiences have not given them the faculties to comprehend certain aspects we might 
deem critical to such a feeling. In the second case, the epistemic transformation provides 
a properly deliberative way for an individual to begin seeing the situation correctly. Once 
Joey does have an experience where they do fall in love (whatever this may be defined by 
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for them), we may consider Joey as having undergone an epistemically transformative 
experience in that they no longer are stunted in the ability to deliberate on actions 
concerning love; they no longer are in an ‘epistemic poverty’. Their viciousness turns to 
proper deliberation in the wake of having greater ability to imagine and understand the 
concept of love.  
In the case of Aubrey, however, this isn’t the nature of their issue. Aubrey’s 
inability to deliberate stems not from an epistemic impoverishment; that is, Aubrey’s 
issue in deliberating isn’t a lack of knowledge. It’s that the type of motivated actions 
required to not be implicitly bias don’t result from deliberation. In fact, Aubrey’s actions 
display implicit biases that may occur despite their deliberation. Aubrey has already 
deliberated and concluded, let’s say, that racist actions and discriminatory behavior 
violates their morality and the way they are motivated to act; yet, the unconscious biases 
imbued in their interactions with others remains. They may say, interact, and imagine in 
accordance with these biases despite expressing intention and beliefs to the contrary. As 
such, an epistemically transformative experience won’t help Aubrey transform from 
viciousness to proper deliberation. 
An internalist response to the issue posed by Aubrey might follow something like 
this: epistemic transformation would solve this deliberational issue in that Aubrey lacks 
the ability to imagine and conceive of racial groups properly, thus leading them to 
reiterate certain biases and discriminatory tendencies. This seems to miss the point by 
crudely dodging the real issue with Aubrey’s unconscious biases. First, it’s not clear that 
Aubrey can’t imagine an individual of another racial group in whatever way we might 
deem proper. This seems clear from Aubrey’s conclusion that racism does not fall in line 
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with their principles and that they ought to not be racist and discriminatory. It seems 
unlikely that Aubrey concludes that racism is a moral ill without being able to at least 
imagine an alternative conception of other racial groups that doesn’t view them as 
inferior. This suggests that Aubrey can in fact imagine and does believe that those of 
other racial groups are in the relevant respects equal or the same as them-self. The issue 
more closely follows that Aubrey can and does imagine a person of a different race in the 
right way consciously but that her first instinct may be to imagine them improperly. Thus, 
there must be a process external to the simple act of having ability to imagine or to 
conclude that structures how we may act and what we may find motivating. 
The issue brought about in Aubrey’s case also extends to the first case of 
viciousness presented earlier - an incapability to deliberate. In this instance, an individual 
– Rory – inhabits a subtly different position to Aubrey. Rory has been so steeped in racist 
upbringings and a particular socialization that the force of reasons contrary to 
discrimination have been systematically undermined in their deliberation. Let us imagine 
further that Rory is perhaps the most vicious character with respect to racism. Despite 
repeated experiences with persons of other racial groups, Rory remains staunchly racist 
and reiterates their beliefs by spouting racist rhetoric and jokes. We could even imagine 
that one of Rory’s close friends may be a person from another racial group, a quiet 
contradiction to the speech and actions of Rory’s racism. To make such an individual 
perhaps more realistically possible, we might understand Rory’s racism and his resulting 
viciousness on the issue to be a matter of various factors. Perhaps Rory’s identity 
strongly links with the aesthetic and upbringing of his racist socialization. Perhaps Rory 
truly feels that individuals of other races are inferior and has never bothered to question 
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such an intuition. Perhaps positive reinforcement of these beliefs in the community 
incentivize Rory to ignore reason and remain vicious. Regardless, Rory’s deliberation is 
so improper, so vicious, that an epistemically transformative experience will not result in 
a shift to proper deliberation. Despite the reasons and experiences Rory already has, Rory 
remains incapable of deliberating on such information because of the context of their 
deliberation - their socialization. More reasons, experiences, and even a better ability to 
imagine will not help change Rory’s inherent motivation to ignore reason with respect to 
race.   
Where does the internalist account tweaked for epistemic transformations then 
leave vicious individuals? We know that both Aubrey and Rory can change for the better, 
but it remains unclear by what process in a deliberative framework we can ascribe their 
change from viciousness to virtuousness. Even if we identify the process of this 
transformation, what is it that exactly changes? The question remains how individuals of 
the type represented by Aubrey and Rory may change their motivations when 
deliberation fails to be an avenue for that transformation, and further how philosophy 
may help. 
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Habituation 
 We might begin to understand what critically changes about Rory and Aubrey by 
analyzing what we intuitively grasp from changing our own behavior and the habits 
associated with them. Consider an individual who realizes they have a quick temper. By 
way of deliberation, they have concluded – let’s assume correctly – that the ease by 
which they become angry has become unhealthy and a hindrance to their self-growth. 
The simple act of concluding and coming to change one’s motivations don’t necessarily 
indicate that the person will begin to act differently. This doesn’t seem to be just a matter 
of incapability as I define it earlier but could also, as is the case with Aubrey, indicate an 
inability to act differently despite one’s deliberation. In the case of the individual with a 
quick temper, we might realize that the process of change is not as simple as a change of 
motivation and therefore a resulting action. Rather, the habits this person must develop 
inform how well their motivations lead to the proper actions. The person with a temper 
must begin to habituate properly when anger arises and start a process of conforming 
action to their conclusions and motivations. That is, the context of both deliberation and 
action play a monumental role in the interplay between these two processes. In an 
Aristotelian fashion, deliberation itself and its resulting motivations and actions cannot 
occur without the proper framing and context. It’s this habituation that seems to be a key 
external process that affects both deliberation and action. 
 While largely affecting deliberation, this process is decidedly the result of a non-
deliberative effort or transformation. Of course, an individual can deliberate rationally to 
begin the process of re-habituating themselves away from vicious tendencies - much like 
Aubrey realizes they have implicit biases and wishes to change them; however, the 
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process of re-habituation itself does not involve inference or a deliberative route as the 
internalist understands it. The process of re-situating oneself seems more akin to 
strengthening and conditioning a muscle to perform a particular action, or muscle 
memory. The habits associated with how one engages in their practical reasoning and 
how those motivations result in particular actions cannot be another process of 
deliberation itself. We might think about imaginative habits, intuitions, and instincts as 
encompassing why the world may have external effects on our deliberation. The way in 
which we imagine things may not be so much a matter of content but rather how our 
imaginative view of a situation “marks off or determines...presenting elements that 
correspond to our view of what is to be pursued or avoided” (Nussbaum 77).  
Namely, the salient features we may draw from a situation are more likely a result 
of how our cognition instinctually and intuitively tends to recognize and focus on 
particular details over others. The structure of what we perceive and therefore emphasize 
in our deliberation is “noninferential, nondeductive” and often shaped simply by our 
upbringing (Nussbaum 74). The repeated experiences Aubrey might need to unlearn her 
biases - or which features they focus on in their imagining of an individual from another 
racial group - don’t matter by way of conveying more information to Aubrey; rather, 
these experiences may perform what should be understood as a sensitization process 
where Aubrey can evolve their perception or imagination to better choose salient features 
instinctually. Rory’s vicious habituation involves undermining certain elements as 
important and recognizing others as compelling reasons for an identity, belief system, and 
worldview that are problematic. As such, Rory’s picking and choosing of salient features 
can involve deliberation but in the imaginative and intuitive sense it seems that it most 
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likely doesn’t. As Aristotle posits, this imaginative intuition and instinct can best be 
described as a sort of ‘practical wisdom’ borne out of having many experiences, not 
important for their ability to provide new information or abilities but rather for their role 
as sensitizing one to the right instinctual recognition of important elements in a situation.  
 
A Better Framework: Fricker’s Perceptual Judgement 
We can adapt Fricker’s framework for judgement in understanding testimonial 
injustice to more clearly hone in on my usage of the Aristotelian ideas of moral training 
and perception. Fricker outlines five principles in the virtue ethic tradition that follow the 
framework I plan to use. In this section, I will touch upon only three of the principles to 
make the rudimentary framework clear. 
First, Fricker’s “model for judgement is perceptual, and so non-inferential” 
(Fricker 72). For such a framework, the virtuous agent is distinguished by a “capacity for 
moral perceptual judgement” (Fricker 72). That is, the agent’s socialization and 
upbringing have enabled them to view the world in “moral colour” and discern the 
“morally salient features of the situation confronting them” in the proper way (Fricker 
72). The virtuous agent thus does not need to deliberate in the classical sense when faced 
with a moral dilemma. They merely see the situation initially as requiring a certain 
judgement and response when presented in the proper way, and this results in a 
perceptual judgement that is both “spontaneous and unreflective” (Fricker 72). This 
points us to a “model for non-inferential judgement” that best describes how the process 
of seeing a situation aright may evolve from a non-deliberative route. 
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Secondly, Fricker argues two more principles: that perceptual judgement can be 
both motivating and rationally justified. Moral perception on her account are 
“intrinsically motivating” in that seeing a situation through a moral lens calls for “one or 
another practical response from relevant parties” (Fricker 77). That is, the salient features 
one recognizes immediately causes an unreflective judgement of a situation that then 
implies a proper response or action. If Aubrey virtuously perceives their action in a 
situation to be unjust, bias, or bad, they are - from the moment of judgement - motivated 
to change their action to a response that they perceive to be proper. Furthermore, if 
Aubrey’s perception of the situation is virtuous, they have good reason to perceive and 
believe what they do about the situation via the salient features recognized; that is, they 
are justified rationally in their judgement by the actual elements and context of the 
situation they recognize. These salient features are reasons then in a non-deliberative 
route. The facts to be perceived in a situation through a proper moral lens construct a 
concept of non-deliberative reasons; reasons that lead to motivations but not through 
inference or argumentation. Fricker takes this a step further by relying on McDowell’s 
elaboration that “if [actions] manifest a virtuous person’s distinctive way of seeing 
things, they must be explicable...in terms of exercises of that perceptual capacity, which 
need no supplementing with desires to yield a full specification of reasons” (McDowell 
77).  
So, not only are perceptions both motivating and justified by reasons, there need 
not be a reliance on desire for something or weighted values placed on various items in 
one’s subjective motivational set to have reasons for taking a particular action. If 
perceptual judgement is then structured by our environment and how we are raised - the 
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salient features we have been socialized and have made habit to recognize - we can 
finally find space for what might be external reasons in the development of proper moral 
and epistemic sensibilities. Thus, we can shirk the problematic internalist account for one 
that offers the vicious person an answer to their viciousness that doesn’t involve simply 
labeling them as irrational. 
 
Perception and Moral Training 
Using Fricker’s framework, vicious persons like Rory and Aubrey exhibit the 
need for proper re-habituation in both perception and moral training. Perception, as 
Fricker indicates, describes the salient features of a situation that we recognize and 
emphasize in the proper way. That is, in the non-deliberation of judgement, our 
perceptions focus on and derive reasons from the context and details of the situation; 
thus, we can understand perception as the route parallel to the internalist route of 
deliberation to motivation. It is responsible for helping conceive of motivations and 
preferences. The link between motivation and action, however, - an issue elucidated by 
the individual with a bad temper - denotes a second part of re-habituation that involves a 
process of reiterated and habituated action. The processes that shape one’s habits of 
action are what Fricker coins from Aristotle as “moral training” or “habituation by way of 
practice and example” (Fricker 81). While these may not be the exact same manner in 
which Aristotle used these terms, I move to define these two processes under habituation 
as two distinct but connected issues when we understand personal transformations. Thus, 
habituation or “ethical sensibility” encompasses two key ideas about the changes needed 
for Rory and Aubrey: a change in their perception - the morally salient features 
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recognized as motivating reasons - and a reshaping of their moral training - the habits of 
action in response to these motivations (Fricker 82).  
We should also note that Fricker believes that “ethical sensibility.... [involves] at 
least two distinct streams of input: social and individual — in that order” (Fricker 82). 
The social coming first in the sense that individuals become inculcated in the ethical 
tradition of their communities and their environments first before individual re-
habituation. Fricker then opens the possibility that training of these ethical sensibilities on 
the individual input can occur through experiences: “ethical responsibility demands that 
the individual generate an appropriate critical link between the traditional moment in 
which she gains her primary ethical socialization and the experiences that life offers her 
— experiences which may sometimes be in tension with her ethical socialization so as to 
prompt critical reflection on the sensibility which she has otherwise simply inherited” 
(Fricker 82). This is critical to my argument. Where Fricker means personal and 
individual experiences lay the foundation for understanding re-habituation and reflection 
on training of the ethical sensibilities, I am arguing that the first input - the social - may 
also be an external source for a critical reflection on habituation for the individual. The 
question remains as to how these experiences may occur and what they look may like 
more clearly.  
A model for non-inferential judgement: 
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Personal Transformations 
 L.A. Paul’s framework for understanding transformative experiences describes a 
personally transformative experience as one that “can change who you are, in the sense 
of radically changing your point of view” (Paul 16). More specifically, these experiences 
change “what it is like for you to be you...your personal preferences, and perhaps even 
change the kind of person that you are or at least take yourself to be” (Paul 16). The 
shock of a radically and subjectively transformative experience may alter the things you 
care about, the values you have, and how you deliberate. In this sense, the personally 
transformative experience doesn’t just give you new reasons; it drastically alters how you 
see yourself, your values, and old reasons.  
Personally transformative experiences don’t necessarily need to be epistemically 
transformative as well, but they often are. Experiencing a situation that can only be truly 
felt by having the experience firsthand often does have the effect of being personally 
transformative. We might consider experiences like childbirth, particular traumatic events 
such as the death of a child or parent, religious conversions, new sensory abilities, and 
falling in love as often inducing personal and epistemic transformations. Paul sees these 
types of experiences - that are both epistemically and personally transformative - as 
“crossroads in your path towards self-realization” in that such experiences shape how you 
conceive of your place in the world and what context you may bring - the bedrock of an 
identity (Paul 17). Thus, these types of experiences are, from a philosophical perspective, 
of immense interest. Paul’s framework for transformative experiences not only purely 
applies to transformative decisions but also still heavily relies on deliberation as a 
fundamental conception of why and how individuals act in the way they do.  
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 I draw on Paul’s framework to make explicit what I think must be implicit in her 
discussion of personally transformative experiences. Although Paul doesn’t seem to 
mention in her deliberative framework perception or moral training in the Aristotelian 
sense, her discussion of personally transformative experiences suggests the type of 
habituation shifts we as philosophers may be interested in given Fricker’s framework. 
Yet, Paul’s discussion of how personally transformative experiences “[change] your 
subjective value for what it is like to be you, and [change] your preferences about what 
matters” assumes the ideal rational agent (Paul 17). If we approach this “what matters” as 
involving how one perceives the salient features of a situation, however, the personally 
transformative experience seems to do what the vicious person needs; it fundamentally 
alters the features you emphasize and recognize and thus begins the process of re-
habituation. We can imagine how the experience of falling in love may transform an 
individual personally in that features of a relationship such as sex, companionship, and 
other aspects of care take on a more substantial and fulfilling role. The old reasons take 
on a new light via a drastically altered perception and therefore result in a new judgement 
of certain features.  
These new judgements don’t seem to be choices for the transformed individual; 
yet, Paul’s framework seems concerned with a picture of “realistic normative decision 
theory” where “you experience yourself as a located, conscious self with control over 
who you are and how you evolve by making choices, at each experienced present, to 
perform or avoid particular acts” (Paul 19, 106). As Fricker and McDowell indicate, 
however, one’s preferences about what matter or ‘who you are’ are often not up to you. 
This seems to be the whole force of Fricker’s examples on circumstantial bad luck. 
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External reasons do weigh in on how you decide what matters and even how you begin to 
comprehend the features you can recognize as being up for consideration.  
Paul admits her consideration of transformative experience happens in a 
framework of “realistic normative decision theory”, a theory of how individuals ought to 
deliberate (Paul 19). That is, it ignores the role of socialization in determining those 
preferences because this seems to be too descriptive rather than normative. Thus, Paul’s 
defense of normative decision theory is that in an ideal world we should consider the 
decision theory as the proper framework for how humans should make decisions and 
come to be motivated by reasons. While I do believe that Fricker and McDowell would 
disagree by indicating that the model of non-inferential judgement is not purely 
descriptive - it also seems to be normatively better - my project here is not to prove such. 
Regardless of this point, my main exploration is to ask whether, given a realistic model of 
human ethical development, philosophy is capable of providing the reasons and 
experiences to transform the vicious into the virtuous. Thus, I will use a descriptive 
framework for understanding transformative experiences rather than a normative one as 
Paul does. Therefore, as I have shown, the non-inferentialist model steeped in 
Aristotelian virtue ethic tradition seems to be the most accurate and descriptive for 
addressing the problem posed by vicious persons. 
 
Transformation as a Process 
Transformative experiences often don’t transform instantaneously; re-habituation 
may often involve a process. Much like concluding to a particular motivation doesn’t 
ensure an agent properly acts, personally transformative experiences often don’t 
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instantaneously ‘transform’ you from viciousness to virtuousness. Unlike, say, a religious 
conversion that suddenly transforms you into finding spiritual elements as compelling 
reasons, personally transformative experiences can shock you into realizing that you need 
to re-habituate yourself for motivations and reasons you may already find compelling.  
Consider the case of Aubrey. Aubrey’s transformative experience could have 
transformed them personally by showing them the effect and extent of their biases but 
more importantly the need to begin re-habituating themself. One example that most 
realistically comes to mind involves a repeated encounter with a person from another 
racial group, whereby an assumption Aubrey makes reveals to them and the person of 
interaction that Aubrey holds certain biases. For example, Aubrey assumes a 
characteristic of a person based on their race, and the affected person responds with 
strong emotions. The situation becomes heated and Aubrey - an individual who prides 
themself on an identity of treating others equally - has been deeply affected for 
unintentionally causing harm and discomfort. This experience becomes transformative 
personally if it helps Aubrey realize where they went wrong in emphasizing a certain 
feature incorrectly - changing their perception - but also in that it may indicate to them a 
need for a type of moral training - the exercise of their ethical sensibility by having 
repeated interactions with persons of other racial groups. Aubrey can now involve a 
process of re-habituation themself because an experience has transformed their 
perception, and in transforming their perception transforms their judgements and 
subsequent responses. 
As is the case with childbirth, death of family members, religious conversion, and 
other transformative experiences, personally transformative experiences are often 
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moments of change and deeply specific to the individual; they seem to be outside the 
realm of our influence in inducing them. It may be that both Rory and Aubrey may live 
their entire lives with circumstantial bad luck in that they may never have the personally 
transformative experiences needed to re-habituate them from viciousness to virtuousness. 
This poses a question of how philosophers and society, in general, can help the vicious 
become the virtuous. As I discussed with Fricker earlier, Fricker believes that critical 
reflection of one’s habituation must involve the individual and their subjective 
experience, but this doesn’t necessarily rule out the possibility of society positing a 
similar experience that retains its specificity to the individual while still providing much-
needed personal transformation. More clearly, I ask if the social input in Fricker’s 
conception of ethical sensibility can also be responsible for intentionally helping 
individuals critically reflect on their habituation. 
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Art as Personally Transformative Experience 
If we assume a model for moral judgement that is non-inferential – a model of the 
type Fricker outlines – it becomes clear that proper perception and moral training can 
only come about via practice and example; that is, as Miranda Nussbaum describes, “a 
matter of learning” or instruction of “the right sort of vision of the concrete” (Nussbaum 
160). By concrete, Nussbaum indicates that moral development must involve “a respect 
for the irreducibly particular character of a concrete moral context and the agents who are 
its components” (Nussbaum 162). Fricker also adopts this idea in her framework that 
“good judgement is uncodifiable” and that “no set of rules could capture in advance the 
educated improvisations of a virtuous moral perceptual sensitivity” (Fricker 73). 
Furthermore, any codification of rules for moral development and action must follow 
“after the fact of virtuous judgement” (Fricker 73). This is all to prove that moral 
development must involve instruction of the sort that retains the flexibility and 
improvisation that proper moral judgement calls for. More specifically, moral “progress 
comes not from the teaching of abstract law but by leading the friend, or the child, or the 
loved one - by a word, by a story, by an image - to see some new aspect of the concrete 
case at hand” (Nussbaum 160). That is, moral progress must pay close attention to the 
rich detail and complexity of actual life and what it’s like to exercise proper moral 
sensibility. 
In its need for exercise and specificity, moral progress must involve experience of 
the sort that invokes a concrete application of ethical sensibility. As Nussbaum 
elaborates: 
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“a person armed only with...general principles and 
rules...would, even if she managed to apply them to the 
concrete case, be insufficiently equipped by them to act 
rightly in it. It is not just that the standing terms need to be 
rendered more precise in their application to a concrete 
text. It is that, all by themselves, they might get it all 
wrong; they do not suffice to make the difference between 
right and wrong” (Nussbaum 156) 
 
Thus, general rules and abstract laws cannot help the individual without virtuous 
perception in that the reasons emphasized in such abstract laws will not be recognized 
properly in moral situations and therefore cannot help result in proper 
judgements.  Without proper perception, one cannot discern reasons effectively, and 
applying general rules to specific situations will fail to follow good moral sensibility. 
 Nussbaum argues that in a dearth of actual experience art can do what abstract 
treatises cannot; it can help us exercise our moral sensibilities through imagination. Art 
elicits our “moral attention” and “calls forth our active sense of life, which is our moral 
faculty” (Nussbaum 162). Nussbaum posits that through our imagination we can begin to 
perceive as if we were doing so in an actual concrete moral dilemma. That is, “the 
characters’ emotions, their stirred intelligence, their moral consciousness, become thus, 
by sufficiently charmed perusal, our own adventure” (Nussbaum 162). We can further 
understand that it’s not the ability to imagine a situation from its plot that comes in handy 
for experiential knowledge gained through art but rather the construction of an 
imaginative vista to explore the interactions between the situation’s elements and its 
characters. This is merely to point out that thought-experiments of the variety used by 
philosophy cannot replace the imaginative aspects of literature and film. If this were the 
case, all novels, paintings, and films could induce the same effect by describing their 
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technical plot points or features. It would be absurd to describe the effect and experience 
of many great novels or films like Thomas Pynchon’s The Crying of Lot 49 or the Coen 
brothers’ The Big Lebowski by their plots largely because nothing of great action really 
happens.  
 Art has a profound and unique ability to personally transform us. If we recall, the 
personally transformative experience transforms our perception and moral training, by 
allowing us to start a process of critically reflecting on our habituation and ethical 
sensibility. That is, personally transformative experiences remove us from our natural 
habituation and shock us into what that is like, having the effect of fundamentally 
changing our worldview and who we think we are. As Nussbaum argues, art exhibits the 
same capacity for removing us from our current habituation via imagination: 
“When we examine our own lives, we have so many 
obstacles to correct vision, so many motives to blindness 
and stupidity...A novel, just because it is not our life, places 
us in a moral position that is favorable for perception and it 
shows us what it would be like to take up that position in 
life. We find here love without possessiveness, attention 
without bias, involvement without panic...it does not seem 
far-fetched to claim that most of us can read [a work of art] 
better than we can read ourselves” (Nussbaum 162) 
 
While we may still need some prior experiences to even begin to approach certain works 
of art for the moral truth they may have, art can act as the personally transformative 
experience we need to critically re-evaluate our habituation in that it removes us from our 
current habituation and biases in its exercise. 
Furthermore, art maintains the deeply personal and subjective nature required of 
actual personally transformative experiences. As described earlier, moral communication 
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“partakes both of the specificity and of the emotional and imaginative richness of [one’s] 
individual moral effort” (Nussbaum 153). Art differs from instruction of abstract rules, in 
utilizing the individual’s own faculties of perception and moral sensibility and remains 
specific to them. The individual can only draw upon their own specific experiences, 
sensibility, and perception to become transformed personally by a work of art; that is, the 
individual can only exercise their own imagination to remove themselves from their 
habituation. They cannot be told the effect of art and having it be transformative; they 
must experience it via their own lens and processes. Therefore, the art itself holds a 
unique and deeply distinctive relationship with the individual transformed. 
The empiricist may respond by indicating that there is no restriction on art in its 
construction of moral truths and in how it may transform vicious individuals. I entirely 
agree that art can mislead and transform an individual for the worse, or towards less 
proper moral sensibilities. To believe that art has no burden of faithfulness to some form 
of proper perception, however, characterizes art as a purely “rootless relativism” 
(Nussbaum 155). Much like there may be flawed philosophy, art may also fail to “be 
responsively alive and committed...to the evolving narrative, to the laws and constraints 
of the genre and its history” (Nussbaum 155). That is, “artists...are not free to simply 
create anything they like” (Nussbaum 155). The greatness in their work resides in how 
the art may elicit an experience that in some way “renders reality, precisely and 
faithfully” (Nussbaum 155). This doesn’t mean that art presents reality as it is in the 
clearest sense of, say, a non-fiction technical account of an event, a photograph or a 
hyper-realistic painting but rather that it represents some key aspects of the human 
experience by capturing such elements in the imagination. A fictional account of a moral 
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dilemma may capture the interactions and moral questions at stake better than a non-
fiction account by virtue that its use of the imagination renders a moral truth more clearly 
than a purely technical summary. That is because art emphasizes and helps draw out the 
salient features of a situation via our imagination it may help us grow our own 
sensibilities of perception as well. While this doesn’t fully answer the empiricist’s 
skepticism of how good art may come to be justified, I pose that what makes 
distinguishing good from bad art realizes the truly powerful aspects of art; that it is hard 
to verify the correctness of something at a general level that remains so specific and 
personal in its impact at the individual level. How we may reconcile art’s subjectivity 
with philosophy’s emphasis on justification seems to be an important question that I 
don’t have good answers for. An inquiry of this kind would be an invaluable continuation 
of this paper and I know that others have and will continue to provide compelling 
answers on that question. 
 Such an emphasis on art and experience in moral development begs the question 
of how philosophy may be relevant, if at all. Could we have done away with this entire 
paper and all of its commentary for a series of quotations from various novels or clips 
from a film? Is there any room left for the impact of philosophical inquiry or criticism on 
moral progress? I argue that philosophy fundamentally supplements our experiences and 
our adventures in art. Without philosophical commentary, the relations between moral 
truths presented in varying forms of art and experience would have no way of 
“sketching” itself out (Nussbaum 161). Great works of art provide great moral truths and 
often can be personally transformative but even such experiences do not “set 
[themselves] besides other conceptions of moral attention and explain [their] differences 
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from them” (Nussbaum 161). For this reason, philosophy holds a unique position to 
compare, to humbly accept its limitations for influencing moral progress but to still offer 
“an outline that directs us to [the] salient features of our moral life”, using art and 
experience as the bread and butter of its instruction (Nussbaum 161). 
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Conclusion 
Philosophy has immense power to sway and reveal important insights about the 
world, its moral truths, and ourselves, but its emphasis on empiricism and a strict 
‘objective’ justification of its reasons renders it both ineffective and inhuman. Instead of 
an empirical view of ethics, I believe that a non-inferential model of moral judgement 
akin to Miranda Fricker’s framework for understanding testimonial injustice provides a 
more realistic and human approach to the issue of flawed moral sensibility. Furthermore, 
the nature of human difference naturally breeds a viciousness in all of us to understanding 
personal and subjective experiences as we should. This transition from viciousness to 
virtuousness presents an opportunity, a gateway, into understanding personal 
transformation through art. It’s faithfulness to the specifity and complexity of moral 
situations and its deeply personal effect reveal it as a medium of human expression that 
can provide both guidance and transformation on matters of perception and moral 
training. Thus, I recommend that philosophy supplement its arguments at its most basic 
level with references and instruction that involves experience. Art should play a critical 
role in our philosophical discourse in that it elicits our sensibilities rather than merely 
explains and defines them. Rather than relegate it to a secondary position of priority – a 
position that normatively asserts art as both epistemically and morally less relevant than 
philosophical papers – I argue that philosophy should most directly concern itself as a 
guiding supplement to art, rather than the other way around. Philosophy seems at its best 
when it combines and compares the truths we may derive from experience and art and 
discusses them in an inquiry that engages our emotions, that forces us to grapple with our 
realities in ways to make us not only know the right sensibilities but to feel them as well. 
